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HOME USE OF VIDEOTAPE RECORDERS (VTRs):
INFRINGEMENT OR FAIR USE?
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America
659 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982)
LAURIE SCHUSTER, 1983*
The copyright clause' of the United States Constitution empowers
Congress to promote the progress of technology and to protect intellec-
tual property rights2 by granting to authors the exclusive right to the
use of their work. In reality, however, those rights are subject to an
intricate balancing of the interest in exclusivity of the copyright owner
against the public interest in unrestricted access to copyrighted works.3
The copyright scheme, as currently embodied in the 1976 Copyright
Act,4 requires the accommodation of these competing interests. In or-
der to accomplish this accommodation, courts have developed the "fair
use" doctrine as a principal balancing tool.5
* B.A., University of Illinois, 1980; Candidate for J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1983.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides, in pertinent part, that Congress has the power to
enact laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The
economic philosophy behind this clause is that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
"Science and the useful Arts." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
2. A copyright is regarded as an intellectual property right, since the author's right to his
work results from the production of intellectual labor. H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 1-2 (3d
ed. 1952).
3. In addition to being subjected to a balancing process, the exclusive rights granted to
authors by the Constitution are modified by two restrictions. One restriction is for exemptions
from copyright control which Congress may expressly make to accommodate competing constitu-
tional interests. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 49-57 (1978). The other
restriction is the public's implied right to use copyrighted materials in certain ways without per-
mission, a right known as "fair use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979). For an in-depth discussion
of the fair use doctrine, see infra notes 27-39, 52-125 and accompanying text.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979). Implicit in both the Constitution and the 1976 Act
is the idea that authors should be encouraged to create and disseminate their works through the
promise of economic reward. For example, the Act grants certain exclusive rights to copyright
owners in their works, for limited times, including the exclusive right to make copies of their
copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
[Tihe owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies
of phonorecords of the copyrighted work...; (4). . . to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and (5). . . to display the copyrighted work publicly.
5. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1977),
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The growing use of home videotape recorders (VTRs) 6 by private
individuals to record copyrighted television programs raises the ques-
tion of whether such recording infringes the copyright owner's exclu-
sive right to make copies of the televised material or whether such
recording is protected under the fair use doctrine. 7 In Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica,8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that unauthorized home video
recording of copyrighted materials on the Betamax VTR constituted
copyright infringement and was, therefore, not entitled to protection
under the fair use doctrine.9 In reversing the district court's finding of
fair use, the Ninth Circuit stressed the need to avoid a blurring of the
distinction between the issue of liability and the type of relief available
to copyright owners as a result of home copying.1°
This comment will focus on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica, with particular attention
paid to the court's application of the fair use doctrine. It will attempt to
place the decision in perspective through a brief review of the genesis
of the fair use doctrine I as applied under the 1909 Copyright Act 12 and
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright.- The "Exclusive
Rights" Tension in the New CopyrightAct, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 215 (1977). The 1976 Act,
moreover, has incorporated existing fair use doctrine in its text. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979).
6. Sony began to market its Betamax VTR to the public in November, 1975. Wall St. J.,
Mar. 28, 1977, at 6, col. 2. The VTR is a device capable of off-the-air recording and playback of
material broadcast for television reception. The VTRs included various options such as built-in
timers and remote pause controls. The timer enables the VTR to record a television program at a
preselected time, while the owner is otherwise engaged. The pause control allows the interruption
of whatever function the machine is in. Thus, if an individual views the broadcast while recording
with Betamax, the pause button may be used to omit undesireable segments, such as commercials,
from the recording. The fast forward capability enables the playback viewer to pass over un-
desireable portions. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435-
36 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
7. The copyright implications of the new VTR technology were not fully addressed by the
Act since the interest of the public vis-a-vis the copyright owner were not defined. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979). Videotapes would be included within the statutory definitions of
"audiovisual works" and "copies" as set forth in § 101 but generally, except for provisions such as
§ 108(0(3) concerning "archives of an audiovisual news program" and § 11 (e) concerning "non-
simultaneous secondary transmissions by cable systems," the new Act does not consider
videotapes.
8. 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'g, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), cert. granted 102 S.
Ct. 2926 (1982).
9. Id
10. Id at 976.
11. Prior to the 1976 Act, the fair use doctrine was a judicially created defense used to rebut
allegations of copyright infringement. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afdper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). See
generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as NIM-
MER]; Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43 (1955); Freid,
Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497 (1976-1977); Note, Constitutional Fair Use,
20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 851 (1978).
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later codified in the 1976 Copyright Act. 13 The Sony opinion will then
be presented and analyzed. Finally, the impact of this decision upon
other issues in copyright law will be considered with a suggestion of
coping with future copyright problems by a means other than deference
to congressional determination.
HISTORY
The purpose of a copyright is to grant copyright owners a limited
property right in the form of expression of their ideas. 14 The celebrated
Statute of Anne' 5 was the first statute to recognize the rights of authors
to their works and was the foundation of all subsequent copyright legis-
lation both in the United States and abroad. However, the Statute of
Anne was limited in scope, since it was applicable solely within Britain
to British books.' 6 Thus, after the Revolutionary War, several states
passed laws to afford a measure of protection to authors, but these laws
were similarly limited in scope to operate solely within the boundaries
of the particular state.
The framers of the United States Constitution sought to remedy
this problem by including within the Constitution a copyright clause
that serves as the basis for all federal copyright law. 17 Implicit in the
Constitution is the idea that authors should be encouraged to create
and disseminate their creative works through the promise of economic
reward.' 8
Congress quickly became the champion of authors' rights and in
1790 the first federal Copyright Act 19 was created to implement consti-
tutional goals concerning copyright protection. Thus, a copyright is
entirely the creature of the federal statute which created it.20 The pre-
12. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter referred to as the 1909 Act].
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979). Alleged infringements which occurred prior to
January 1, 1978 will be governed by the copyright statutes then in effect. Any infringements after
January 1, 1978 will be governed by the 1976 Act.
14. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10, July 31, 1978.
15. 8 Anne ch. 19, 1710.
16. So far as existing works were concerned, the statute provided that the authors or their
assigns should have the sole right of publication for 21 years, but for new works the right was to
run for 14 years, and the author was granted the privilege of renewal for another 14 years. See H.
HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (3d ed. 1952).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.
of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 447 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 85, 90 (1978).
19. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 124.
20. A copyright has been defined as "the right of literary property as recognized and sanc-
tioned by positive law" or as "an intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the author or
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amble of the 1790 Act recited that the purpose of the Act was to en-
courage learning "by securing the copies of maps, charts and books to
authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times mentioned
therein." 21
From the beginning, courts construed the 1790 Act very strictly.
The first case that came before the Supreme Court regarding authors'
rights22 addressed the question of whether the 1790 Act granted perpet-
ual rights to authors in their works, thereby enabling them to obtain
relief against piracy. The Court concluded that whatever exclusive
rights the author may have had in his manuscript before publication
would be abolished forever upon publication unless the author had
strictly complied with all the requirements of the Act.
New subjects were gradually added to the 1790 Act and the scope
and term of copyright protection was enlarged. The Copyright Act of
190923 was the outcome of several years of extensive negotiations on
behalf of every interest involved, including eminent members of the
bar. The "purpose" preamble of the 1790 Act disappeared. However,
an accompanying legislative report24 stated that the purpose of copy-
right was primarily to benefit the public welfare and to promote the
progress of technology and the advancement of ideas. But the 1909 Act
was largely a compromise measure embodying different and disparate
points of view. Changes were made in one place without the seemingly
necessary corresponding changes in other places, resulting in a lack of
clearness and coherence. The 1909 Act began by simply defining the
elements of the exclusive right conferred on authors. It contained very
few statutorily recognized exemptions. 25 All other exceptions 26 to
copyright controls were governed by the judicially created doctrine of
originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period,
with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling
them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (5th ed. 1979).
21. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, i Stat. 124. The Act of 1790 assured protection to the author
or his assigns of any book, map or chart for 14 years upon:
1) recording the title in the Register book of the Clerk's Office of the District Court
where the author or proprietor resided;
2) publishing a copy of the record so made in one or more newspapers for four weeks;
and
3) depositing a copy of the work itself in the office of the Secretary of State within six
months after publication.
Id
22. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
23. 1909 Act, supra note 12.
24. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1907), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 57 (1976).
25. The 1909 Act recognized only one qualified exemption for making a tangible copy of
anything else (for making phonorecords of copyrighted music) and two exemptions for certain
"performances" of copyrighted works-one for nonprofit performance of musical or nondramatic
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fair use, 27 a doctrine that arose in order to permit the buffering of the
seemingly absolute statutory grant of monopolistic rights afforded the
copyright owner under the 1909 Act. 28
In the first fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh ,29 Justice Story, the prin-
cipal Supreme Court architect of early copyright adjudication, laid
down what have since become known as the four traditional fair use
factors: 1) the nature of the work copied, 2) the quantity of materials
used (the substantiality factor), 3) thepurpose for which the work was
used, and 4) the degree to which the use may prejudice the sale or di-
minish the profits of the original work (the harm factor). Commenting
on the applicability of the fair use doctrine, Justice Story said, "it is not
...easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any
general principles applicable to all cases . . the lines . . sometimes,
become almost evanescent, or melt into each other. ' '30
Case law on the availability of a fair use defense 3' in the context of
home videotaping is sparse since the taping of television programs is a
relatively new practice.32 There are, however, a few cases analogous to
the home videotaping situation which have utilized a fair use analysis
in a noncommercial aspect 33 under the 1909 Act. For example, the case
of Wihtol v. Crow34 involved the use by a choral director of the song My
GodandI as the basis for a new arrangement, multiple copies of which
were used by both a church and school choir in performing the ar-
literary work, and another for the playing of records on coin-operated machines. 1909 Act, supra
note 12, at § I(e).
26. An important distinction between the fair use exception and a home use exemption to
copyright liability is that the former must be balanced on the four factor scale of § 107 of the 1976
Act. A home use exemption, however, could be of broader scope since the exemption would arise
purely out of public policy considerations and would not depend on the § 107 test. See Note,
Betamax and Copyright.- The Home Videorecording Controversy, I WHITTIER L. REV. 229, 249
(1979).
27. See infra notes 52-125 and accompanying text.
28. 1909 Act, supra note 12 at § 1 provided in part: "Any person entitled thereto, upon com-
plying with the provision of this Act, shall have the exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint, publish,
copy, and vend the copyrighted work .. " Upon its face, this statutory provision would appar-
ently reserve the right to copy the broadcasted television programs to thq copyright owner and
would not allow unauthorized copying.
29. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
30. Id at 344.
31. It should be noted that fair use is only a defense to a charge of copyright infringement; it
confers no blanket immunity from such charges.
32. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 448-49
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
33. The district court in Sony recognized that the case at bar was noncommercial use in a
new context. Id at 448. For a discussion of commercial/educational use see infra notes 86-104
and accompanying text.
34. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). There, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that the use was an infringement despite the fact that the use made was without intent to
infringe and despite the argument that the use was fair. Id at 780-81.
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rangement. In Wihtol, the Eighth Circuit rejected the fair use defense
because it felt that the Act was meant to be inflexible and because the
use of all or substantially all of a copyrighted work was an
infringement. 35
The court in Walt Disney Productions v. Alaska Television Network,
Inc. 36 addressed the issue of copyright infringement as it related to
cable television systems. The Walt Disney court found that the mere
preparation of video tapes of copyrighted works for delayed broadcast
on a cable system infringed upon the copyright owner's rights under
the then applicable statutory law.37 By recognizing two distinct acts of
copyright infringement, preparation of video tapes and dissemination
of videotaped programs, 38 the Walt Disney decision thus demonstrated
that courts have little difficulty placing videotaping within the exclusive
province of the copyright owner.
Similarly, the court in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks39 found infringement where a nonprofit corporate defendant
videotaped a number of plaintiffs copyrighted films without permis-
sion and subsequently distributed the videotapes among over 100
schools. The court granted a preliminary injunction because it found it
difficult to reconcile defendant's large-scale copying with fair use and
the potentially great injury which threatened plaintiffs market.
In response to rapid technological changes40 which had rendered
the 1909 Act41 obsolete, Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act. 42
Changing technology has made application and effective enforcement
of the copyright law difficult. Looking to both case law43 and the 1976
Act's legislative history,44 the primary purpose of the Act was to stimu-
35. Id
36. 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976).
38. 310 F. Supp. at 1075.
39. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). Encyclopedia Britannica dealt only with the issue of
whether a preliminary injunction should issue enjoining the defendant from videotaping plaintiff's
educational films off the public airwaves. Defendant admitted the copying but asserted the fair
use doctrine as an affirmative defense. The preliminary injunction was granted on a prima facie
showing of infringement. In copyright law, such showing requires that there be a copying and that
the plaintiff owns the copyright for the copied, allegedly infringed work. This case did not go to
the merits and thus did not involve a fully developed fair use analysis. Id
40. Since the enactment of the 1909 Act, subsequent developments in the music and radio
industries, along with a substantial increase in the use of the "new" photocopying technology,
created problems that the 1909 Act was incapable of addressing.
41. 1909 Act, see supra note 12.
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979).
43. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 882
(S.D. Fla. 1978), affd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
44. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659.
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late creativity for the public welfare. The new Act is the result of an
intricate balancing process between two competing interests: the au-
thor's financial interest and the public's interest in the dissemination of
copyrighted works for publik enlightenment. Yet, as will become evi-
dent, the interests of authors and the public are so compelling and so
interwoven that it is often difficult to maintain a balance.
A copyright owner has exclusive control over all uses which are
statutorily given to him.45 The current federal copyright law grants to
the copyright owner "the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation,
publication, performance, and display. ' 46 Among the rights provided
for in the 1976 Copyright Act,47 which took effect January 1, 1978, is
that the copyright owner is notably deemed to be the only person who
can reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or authorize such repro-
duction.48 Thus if a person, unauthorized by the copyright owner, uses
a copyrighted work in a way that is within the scope of one of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner, there is infringement of the
copyright .49
However, Congress and the courts have often found it necessary to
fashion exceptions to this general grant of monopolistic rights in situa-
tions where the public's interest in promoting the development of ideas
and technology conflicts with the author's economic interest in exclu-
sive control over his copyrighted product. While the Act grants to au-
thors the exclusive rights5° to the use of their works, it also places limits
on the exclusivity of those rights by listing a number of qualifications,
exceptions, and exemptions5I designed to safeguard the public's interest
in guaranteed access to, and use of, certain modes of information. The
most comprehensive limitation on a copyright owner's exclusive con-
trol over his works is found in the fair use doctrine.52
45. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1968).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
47. Id. at §§ 101-810.
48. Id at § 106(1).
49. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
50. See supra note 4.
51. Id
52. "Fair use" has been defined as "the privilege in others than the owner of a copyright, to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the
monopoly granted to the owner [by the copyright]." Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), quoting, BALL,
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afl'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). In its discussion of the fair use doctrine, the Senate Report accompanying the 1976 Act
stated:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use ...
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period
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THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Fair use was proclaimed over 140 years ago 53 as a judicial rule
reflecting a public policy of encouraging progress and the dissemina-
tion of knowledge by allowing subsequent authors, composers and
publishers to make fair use of previously protected works. Progress
and learning would be seriously hindered without such access to copy-
righted works. Some use of prior copyrighted works must be permitted
in connection with the independent creations of other authors, for the
very policy which leads the law to encourage creativeness also justifies
facilitating creativeness in others.54
Unlike the previous copyright acts, which contained no express
recognition of a fair use doctrine, the 1976 Act codified this doctrine in
section 107. 55 In addition to recognizing the doctrine, section 107 de-
lineates the four primary factors to be used in making a fair use deter-
mination. The Act provides in part that a court consider:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 56
If a court finds that an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is not a
fair use, then a finding of copyright infringement would be justified.
Generally, the affirmative defense57 of fair use has been defined as
the reasonable, but unconsented, use of copyrighted works despite the
copyright owner's exclusive rights. 58 However, such definition is only
suggestive of its meaning since the doctrine has remained flexible and
of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair
use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.
S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1974). Accord, Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
53. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C. D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
54. See Chafee, Reections on the Law of Copyright. 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979).
56. Id. It should be noted that in drafting § 107, Congress essentially codified the fair use
doctrine as expressed in Williams d Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aftd
per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
57. See supra note 30.
58. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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is to be applied in an ad hoe manner.59 Neither the statutory language
of section 107 nor its legislative history indicates the relative impor-
tance of the various factors involved in the fair use analysis. 60 Since
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason designed to balance the com-
peting interests of encouraging creative work through copyright protec-
tion and promoting broad public availability to various forms of
expression,6' fair use has been considered a factual determination to be
made on a case-by-case basis and cannot be determined exclusively by
arbitrary rules or fixed criteria.62
The Threshold Considerations
An analysis of section 107 makes it clear that the exclusive rights
granted to copyright owners by section 10663 are to be tempered by the
fair use doctrine. According to the first sentence of section 107, fair use
may be claimed "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research." These fair uses may be further categorized asproductive
uses, whereby the user incorporates the information contained in the
copyrighted work in a developmental process, that is, in creating a sec-
ond work or in carrying on research or education.65
59. Congressional legislative history behind the 1976 Act supports this observation:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is
an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5679.
60. The general intention behind § 107 of the 1976 Act was stated in the House Report which
accompanied S. 22 as follows:
: ..The endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise
in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. The bill en-
dorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid tech-
nological change . . .Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5680.
61. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 447 (C.D. Cal.
1979) (quoting Twentieth Century City Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974)). Despite
the policy of encouraging creative work, the primary concern of copyright law is public benefit
rather than benefit to the individual author. 480 F. Supp. at 447 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909)).
62. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979).
64. Id at § 107.
65. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks Different on Video-
tape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013 (1980).
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Although fair use has always involved the use by a second author
of a first author's work, it has previously never involved the mere re-
production of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-its
"ordinary" use.66 It has been suggested that the courts' and commenta-
tors' emphasis on the importance of the harm to the copyright owner's
market has obscured the more fundamental fact that fair use is produc-
tive use.67 Proof that a particular use did not harm the copyright own-
er's market would not conclusively establish fair use. 68 Thus, the
productivity of the use presents a threshold consideration in a fair use
analysis.
The House Report accompanying the Act69 also emphasized the
importance of the public's ability to use the ideas embodied in a copy-
righted work and transcribe them into another form of expression. It
stressed that the productive uses enunciated in the first sentence of sec-
tion 107 alone established the basic fair use doctrine while the four
traditional fair use factors70 were only relevant for determining
whether the doctrine applies in a particular case. 71 In other words,
once a determination is made that a particular use is productive, only
then should a court consider whether the use is a fair one by applying
the traditional four factor fair use analysis. Thus the productivity of a
use, while implicitly acknowledged by case law, has been explicitly rec-
ognized by statute as a threshold consideration. 72
Though necessary, a finding of productive use, absent considera-
tion of the four fair use factors, is insufficient to justify a finding of fair
use. For example, in Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. ,73 where defendants televised an adaptation of plaintiffs copy-
66. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS & FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978). Such "consumptive"
copying has not been the subject of previous judicial consideration because copyright owners have
difficulty detecting infringement that does not result in the promulgation of additional material,
and because until recent technical developments made reproduction inexpensive, there was little
or no incentive for private consumptive infringement. Id at 37-38, 50, 52; Perlman & Rhine-
lander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyright and the Judicial Process,
1975 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 385-91.
67. See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "'Fair Use" Looks Dfferent on
Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013 (1980).
68. Id See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub norn. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided
court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659.
70. For a list of the four traditional fair use factors, see supra text accompanying note 53.
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659.
72. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks Different on Video-
tape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980).
73. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), arf'dsub nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 32 (9th
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righted play, the court denied the defense of fair use. There, the court
said:
The mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copy-
righted work will not make a use fair. The right of the copyright
proprietor to exclude others is absolute and if it has been violated the
fact that the infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of
the work or pecuniarily damage him is immaterial. 74
Furthermore, while the court recognized that parody is a productive
use, 75 which in some instances may be considered fair use,7 6 it sug-
gested that courts are likely to apply the fair use tests more strictly
where the use is for entertainment purposes than where it is for scien-
tific or educational purposes. 77 Finding a broad scope given to fair use
in the field of science and the fine arts, the court noted that fair use
"permits a writer of scientific, legal, medical and similar books or arti-
cles of learning to use even the identical words of earlier books or writ-
ings dealing with the same subject matter. '7 8 The writer of such works
"invites reviews, comments and criticism" for the purpose of the ad-
vancement of learning.79
However, in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,80 where two
government libraries copied entire articles from medical journals and
distributed them to an in-house research staff, the court held such copy-
ing to be fair use even though recipients would make "ordinary" use of
the copyrighted material, by reading the copy rather than the original
work. The court rationalized its finding, however, on the basis that the
ordinary use in that case directly promoted the advancement of
medicine and medical research.8' Hence the public interest in access to
or dissemination of information was held to outweigh the copyright
interest of the medical publishers.
The Four Factors of Fair Use
Although the fair use doctrine has only been recently codified, it
Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's,
Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
74. Id at 184.
75. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that "par-
ody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of
social and literary criticism." (emphasis in original)).
76. Id See NIMMERsupra note 11, at § 13.05[C], 13-59, 61.
77. 131 F. Supp. at 175.
78. Id
79. Id
80. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aft'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
81. Id at 1356.
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has a long history as a judicially created doctrine. 82 A look at this
history, and more particularly, at the history of each factor of the fair
use doctrine could help answer the question of whether home video
recording of television broadcasts would fall under the doctrine or
would constitute copyright infringement.
The Purpose Factor
The first factor to be considered in a fair use analysis is whether
the purpose and character of the use is for educational purposes or is of
a commercial nature.83 Traditionally, the purpose factor has been ap-
plied to determine whether the use of the copyrighted work would fur-
ther the public interest in the dissemination of creative works.8 4 While
educational use has received congressional approval as a subject de-
serving of fair use protection, 85 commercial use has not. 86 Commercial
uses were excluded from fair use in the recent case of Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. ,87 which involved a news-
paper's display of the cover of plaintiff's publication in a televised
advertisement to promote sales of its competing publication by com-
parative advertising. However, the court found that defendant's use of
plaintiff's work in the commercial was protected by the first amend-
ment and could not be constitutionally enjoined. 88
At least one commentator, however, has noticed a new trend
emerging in the character and purpose factor that has expanded the fair
use doctrine by including commercial uses within its scope.8 9 This
trend began in the case of Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
82. Since 1790, Congress has implemented the copyright clause of the United States Consti-
tution with legislation. Copyright protection provides a limited monopoly over subsequent use of
a copyrighted work. See Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 573, 586 (1979). The judicially created fair use doctrine arose as a limitation on the exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners under the 1909 Copyright Act. See Note, Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America: Application ofthe Fair Use Doctrine Under the United
States Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 661, 667 (1980).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. III 1979).
84. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aj'rdper
curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. III 1979).
86. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 880
(S.D. Fla. 1978).
87. Id
88. The Triangle case may well be the first American decision relying expressly and solely on
the first amendment as a defense against copyright infringement. See Note, The First Amendment
Exception to Copyright.: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1158, 1176.
89. Note, Copyright: Limitation on Exclusive Rights, Fair Use, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 1041,
1055-56 (1976).
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House,90 which involved the alleged infringement of a Howard Hughes
biography. There, defendant published a biography that incorporated
two quotations and an eight-line paraphrase from a series of articles
published in plaintiff's magazine. In holding that fair use could prop-
erly be used as a defense, the court stressed the public's right to know
about important public figures and the critical public interest in the free
dissemination of information that would be served by the distribution
of this material.9 '
The trend of allowing commercial uses to be considered fair use
continued in the case of Time, Inc. v. Bernard Gels Associates,92 where
the reproduction in defendant's book of several frames of a copyrighted
film showing President Kennedy's assassination was held to be fair use.
After balancing the value of the copyright to the copyright owner
against the importance of disseminating the material, the court found
that the public interest in having the fullest information available on
the murder of President Kennedy outweighed the interests of the copy-
right owner.93 Since the court found that there was no competition be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, it concluded that there was little, if any,
injury to the plaintiff from defendant's use of the film.
Similarly, the court in Meeropol v. Nizer 94 reasoned that the use of
all or portions of previously published and copyrighted letters of Ethel
and Julius Rosenberg in another book constituted fair use. Like the
Time court, the Meeropol court found that a public interest existed in
and would be furthered by the dissemination of information about im-
portant public figures such as the Rosenbergs. The Meeropol court
held that the book's commercial success was no reason to deny defend-
ants the benefit of the fair use defense. 95
However, neither prior case law nor the Act recognizes entertain-
ment as a purpose sufficient to invoke the fair use doctrine. 96 In
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. ,97 a case involving the telecast of a si-
lent movie starring Rudolph Valentino, the court held that neither the
enduring fame of Valentino nor the intrinsic literary or historical merit
of the movie served any public interest sufficient to justify a finding of
90. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
91. Id at 307, 309.
92. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93. Id at 146.
94. 361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
95. Id at 1068.
96. Even the public's interest in the free dissemination of information has not been found to
include pure entertainment. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
97. Id
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fair use. 98 Thus, while the presence of commercial motives generally
precludes a finding of fair use,99 the absence of commercial motives
even in conjunction with an educational purpose, does not conclusively
determine fair use.' 00
The Nature Factor
The second factor courts must consider in a fair use analysis-the
nature of the copyrighted work-has not been the subject of much
commentary or judicial interpretation,' 0 ' but refers primarily to the
character of the copyrighted material and whether its dissemination
would serve the public interest. 0 2 This factor includes certain aspects
of the purpose factor but can be distinguished because it restricts scru-
tiny to a consideration of the particular purpose for which the copy-
righted work is published. 0 3 While congressional consideration of
section 107 of the Act focused primarily on the issue of reproduction
for classroom purposes, particularly photocopying, '04 one Senate report
explained that the key to the nature factor, although not necessarily
determinative, was the copyrighted work's availability to the potential
user. 0 5 If the work has been published but is currently out of print and
unavailable through normal channels, there is more justification for
copying than if the work were readily available. °6 However, unpub-
lished works receive a narrow fair use interpretation because, although
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distributors, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824 (E.D.
N.Y. 1973); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), af'd
sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), a d by an equally divided court sub
nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
100. Modem television is not entirely an entertainment medium. News documentaries, news
programs, and other educational programs make television a mixed medium, primarily entertain-
ment, but partially a disseminator of important information. Television broadcasts contain not
only entertainment and commercials, which are outside the scope of the fair use doctrine, but also
works in the fields of science, law, medicine, history, and biography. However, considering the
overwhelming entertainment nature of this medium, it would be a substantial extension of the new
trend for a court to find that it permitted the videotaping of television broadcasts to fail under the
fair use doctrine.
101. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 452-53 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J.
1977).
102. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
103. Note, Copyright- Limitation on Exclusive Rights, Fair Use, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 1041,
1057 (1976).
104. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659.
105. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1975).
106. Id
222
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the work is unavailable, the unavailability is a deliberate choice of the
copyright owner. 0 7
The Substantiality Factor
The third fair use factor concerns the substantiality of the copy-
ing. 10 8 Analysis of this factor involves an examination of the extent to
which the original work was copied. 0 9 The substantiality of copying
ranges from small segments to entire works."10 Generally, a complete
copying is never considered fair use even if the copying is done to fur-
ther educational goals and is done without intent to profit from the
copying."' In order to determine whether the use will lead to a reduc-
tion in incentive to create, 1 2 it is also necessary to consider whether the
use made of the reproduction consists of a substantial portion of a
copyrighted work. The traditional approach is to examine the signifi-
cance of the copying' 13 both in qualitative and quantitative terms. 114 It
is therefore necessary to consider not only the sheer amount of the
107. Id
108. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (Supp. III 1979).
109. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied
sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307-10 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967);
Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affdper curiam by an equally divided court sub
nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). Contra, Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afl dper curiam by an equally divided
court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
110. Compare Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afdper
curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopying of 40-50 page articles,
rather than entire periodicals held fair use) with Encylcopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (videotaping of entire copyrighted films from televi-
sion broadcasts held not fair use).
11. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). Many cases have held that the defense of
fair use is never available where the copying is virtually total. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 481 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. deniedsub nom, O'Niell v. Walt Disney Prods.,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (interpreting fair use standards in parody context and interpreting Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), arffidper curiam by an equally divided court sub nom.
Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), as setting a threshold that eliminates fair use
defense where copying is "virtually complete or almost verbatim"); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937); NIMMER supra note 11, at § 13.05[D]I1];
Note, Betamax and Copyright. The Home Videorecording Controversy, I WHITTIER L. REV. 229,
248 (1978) (under traditional view, copying entire work precludes application of fair use defense).
112. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. at 454 ("in the
normal case of copying, the effect that the infringing copy has on the market for the original will
depend to a large extent on whether the copy can substitute for the original").
113. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
114. Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D.N.J. 1977) (a
"bald quintative approach is not determinative" of whether the substantiality factor indicates fair
use).
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work appropriated (the quantitative factor) but also whether the por-
tion copied contains the essence, central premise, or main idea of the
copyrighted work;" 5 whether there is similarity in style or form of ex-
pression between the original and copied works;" t 6 and whether the
copies need to use the appropriated work in the production of the new
work" 7 (the qualitative factors).
While the Senate Report accompanying the Act" 8 provides no
guidance as to whether a complete copying of a copyrighted work
would always prevent a finding of fair use, it stated that excerpts from
the copyrighted work that were not "substantial in length" should be
considered a fair use, providing the other fair use factors were pres-
ent.1 9  However, the court in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States 20 indicated that the general rule was an overbroad generaliza-
tion and rejected the concept of total reproduction as a bar against find-
ing fair use. Therefore, at least one court has determined that while the
extent of the copying was an important factor, it was not dispositive of
the determination of fair use. 121
The Harm Factor
The last fair use factor cited in the Act, the inquiry into whether
the alleged infringer's work tends to diminish or prejudice the potential
sale of the copyrighted work, 122 has usually been considered the most
important factor of the fair use doctrine. 23 In fact, it has been used to
115. Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), a§'dper curiam, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering the importance of the portion
taken in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole).
116. A verbatim copying or very close paraphrasing suggests substantiality, id at 690;
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967); whereas little or no similarity indicates no substantial copying, see Gardner
v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D.N.J.
1977). The "need qualitative factor" is a qualification of the statement of many courts that one is
not entitled to utilize the fruits of another's labor in lieu of his own independent research. See,
e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). Courts have modified the
sweeping generality of this reasoning by allowing the use of portions of a copyrighted work where
the use of the work is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. See, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 223 (D.N.J. 1977) (the nature of the copy-
righted material is such that for all practical purposes defendants needed to copy portions of the
work); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)
(copyrighted work deliberately suppressed and out of circulation for many years).
118. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
119. Id at 65.
120. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afj'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
121. Id at 1353 n.12.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976).
123. NIMMER, supra note 11, at §§ 145, 646.
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explain decisions which would otherwise be quite puzzling. 124 Poten-
tial injury or decrease in value of the copyrighted work is sufficient to
prevent invoking a fair use defense; actual injury is not required. 25
CONTRASTING CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF AUDIO
& VIDEO RECORDING
While home recording of telecasts is a relatively new phenomenon,
home recording of phonorecords by the use of tapes has been present
for some time. 126 The past treatment of phonorecording, therefore,
could give substantial insight into the future treatment of home video
recording.
In 1971, Congress amended title 17 of the United States Code 127
and granted a limited copyright in sound recording to protect such re-
cordings against unauthorized duplication. At the same time, however,
Congress did not intend to stop home audio recording 28 where home
recording was for private use with no purpose of multiple reproduction
or commercial benefit. The congressional reasoning for exempting
home audio recording was that it was by then a very common and un-
restrained practice. 29 Such a widespread practice certainly raises con-
cerns about privacy and enforcement problems.
However, to extend the legislative exception applicable to home
audio recordings to home video recordings is inappropriate for two rea-
sons. First, although the incidence of home video recording has in-
124. Id
125. Courts have adopted a "probable effects" standard which simply requires that the ex-
pected harm be probable. This standard was proposed in Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497, 505 (1977), to explain the process used by courts in the following deci-
sions: Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Addi-
son-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); and Henry Holdt & Co.
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
Applying the last fair use factor to home use of VTRs, it appears that the market for copy-
righted telecasts could be injured. In determining the possible harm to the television market
resulting from the home-use recording of televised programs, an understanding of the economics
of television is essential. Copyright owners in broadcast films do not derive their revenue from
payments by the viewer but from royalities paid by the broadcasters to the owners for the right to
show the copyrighted films on television. Broadcasters, in turn, are compensated by advertisers
who use the televised works as a means of reaching potential consumers of their products. See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 440 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
(discussion of the rudiments of television economics).
126. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566, 1567, 1572.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 1(f) (1976).
128. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19711 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1566, 1572.
129. Id However, this reasoning has been criticized as not providing a sufficiently concrete
basis for governmental approval. NIMMER, supra note 11, at §§ 109.212, 442.7.
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creased, 130 video recording has not yet become a common and
unrestrained practice. Policy concerns applicable to a well-established
practice do not necessarily apply to a fledgling technology. Second,
and most importantly, the statutory language does not support such an
extension. Section 102(a) of the Act, in listing the categories of "works
of authorship" that receive copyright protection, sets out audiovisual
works and sound recordings in separate categories,' 3 1 so that audiovi-
sual works are separate definitional entities from "sound recordings" or
"phonorecords." Section 106 describes the author's exclusive rights in
copyrighted works 132 and section 114 limits those exclusive rights in
sound recordings.' 33 Thus, any express or implied exemption arising
from the conjunction of sections 102(a), 106 and 114 cannot apply di-
rectly to audiovisual works because the statute delineates audiovisual
works and sound recordings as separate categories of protected
materials.
ESTABLISHING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must prove both his ownership of the copyrighted material and
a "copying" by the alleged infringer. 134 A copyright certificate is prima
facie proof of one's ownership in the copyright as well as proof of its
validity. 135 However, it should be noted that compliance with the stat-
utory requirements of notice, 136 deposit,137 and registration 138 is a pre-
130. Of the 80 million American homes that have TV, approximately only 5 million of those
have VTRs. Video Recorder Dispute Nears Crucial Juncture, Wall St. J., May 28, 1982, at 17, col.
3. By 1990, however, it is estimated that nearly 40 million VTRs will be in use. Id.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. III 1979).
132. Id at § 106.
133. Id at § 114. This section reads in part:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of
section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of pho-
norecords, or of copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording.
Id at § 114(b).
134. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979); Sid & Marty Krofft Tele-
vision Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Tele-
vision Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976); 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 141
(1982). Intent is not a necessary factor in finding infringement, and innocence or lack of motive
will not be a defense. See Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978); Wihtol v. Crow, 309
F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962); Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
"Under the civil law, there is strict liability for infringement. Even if the infringer had no eco-
nomic motive and in fact netted no material gain from his conduct, he would still be liable for any
damages caused to the copyright holder." United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 733 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
135. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
136. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-06 (Supp. III 1979).
137. Id at § 407.
HOME USE OF VIDEO RECORDERS
condition to a suit for infringement.139
To prove "copying," the plaintiff must show that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work and that the infringing work is sub-
stantially similar to the work copyrighted.' 40 Access is established by
showing a reasonable opportunity to view the work.' 4' A substantial
similarity between the copyrighted material and the infringing work is
determined by asking whether an ordinary lay observer would detect a
substantial similarity between the two works. 42 If the above factors
are found, then a "copying" has occurred. A "copying" sufficient to
warrant a finding of infringement need not be a conscious act, but may
be the result of one's subconscious memory derived from hearing, see-
ing, or reading the copyrighted work in the past. 43 To rebut a prima
facie case of infringement, the defense of fair use may be raised.
Although the concept of fair use permits a subsequent use of copy-
righted material in a reasonable manner without the owner's consent,
without such use constituting infringement, the exact point at which a
permissible or fair use becomes an infringing use is difficult to deter-
mine. To aid in this determination, courts look to the four factors of
the fair use doctrine.
For example, the use of a fifteen-second segment of a copyrighted
song in a televised political commercial has been held to be fair use.'"
The purpose of the political use was sufficiently removed from the orig-
inal's entertainment purpose, and the fifteen-second borrowing was an
138. Id at §§ 408-12.
139. Levine & Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The Importance of Being Formal, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1232 (1977).
The requirement that an author must as a precondition to the full benefit of copy-
right, register his claim and deposit his work with a designated public official antedates
American copyright law and has been a part of every copyright law enacted in this coun-
try. . . . Registration and deposit. . . will continue to be under the new law, conditions
' * " to the institution of suit to enforcement of copyright.
Id at 1253-54.
140. Comment, Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1185;
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 340 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
141. Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
142. Novelty Textile Mills Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977);
Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1969); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966). Judge Learned Hand expounded upon the lay
observer test when he said that substantial similarity existed where "the ordinary observer, unless
he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
143. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978);
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971); Leo Feist, Inc.
v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
144. Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.
N.H. 1978).
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adequately small amount of the entire copyrighted work to permit fair
use.145 The nature of the borrowed work used in the advertisement was
merely a small segment of a political message rather than an independ-
ent recording. Further, it was found that the use of the short segment
would not greatly diminish future markets for the original work. Thus,
fair use is applied when it is in the public's best interest to allow "copy-
ing" of another's work.
HISTORY OF THE Sony OPINION
In November of 1975, the Sony Corporation began marketing the
Betamax, a videotape recorder that enables private television owners to
record broadcasts and replay them on their own television sets. Uni-
versal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions, two major producers
and owners of copyrighted audiovisual works, some of which were tele-
cast over public airwaves, initially filed suit in 1976 seeking an injunc-
tion to halt consumer use of the Betamax.146 The complaint named as
defendants Sony Corporation (the manufacturer of Betamax recorders
and tapes), Sony Corporation of America (Sonam, the distributor of
the Betamax), four retail stores that sold the Betamax, and a represen-
tative individual owner and user of a Betamax VTR.
Plaintiffs contended that home recording of their copyrighted pro-
grams by individual Betamax owners constituted copyright infringe-
ment and that the corporate defendants were either directly or
contributorily liable for such infringement. 147 Relying implicitly on the
fair use doctrine, defendants asserted that home use recording with
VTRs by individual Betamax owners did not amount to copyright
infringement. 48
After three years of litigation and a five-week nonjury trial, the
district court entered judgment for defendants. Finding protection for
home videorecording under the fair use doctrine and an implied excep-
tion for home videorecording in the legislative history of the copyright
law, the court also held that even if home videorecording constituted
copyright infringement none of the corporate defendants could be held
directly, contributorily, or vicariously liable.
145. Id at 961.
146. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
147. Plaintiffs also alleged that retail defendants violated the copyright law by recording por-
tions of plaintiffs' programs when demonstrating Betamax recorders to prospective customers. Id.
at 432.
148. All references made to the "Sony court" in this article shall apply to the recent opinion
issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. In a partial reversal of the district court
decision, 149 the Ninth Circuit held that off-the-air copying of telecasts
of copyrighted audiovisual materials by VTR owners for private, non-
commercial use constituted infringement; home users of VTRs did not
fall within the scope of the fair use doctrine. The Ninth Circuit also
held that appellees were contributorily liable' 50 for infringement be-
cause they knew that the videotape recorders would be used to
reproduce copyrighted materials. However, the case was remanded to
the district court for a consideration of the appropriate relief to be
granted.
REASONING OF THE Sony COURT
The Sony court' 5' devoted most of its discussion to and began its
analysis by addressing the issue of whether off-the-air copying of copy-
righted works by Betamax owners for private, noncommercial use con-
stituted infringement. To aid it in reaching a decision, the court found
it necessary to subdivide its discussion of this issue by separately ad-
dressing the questions of whether the district court erred in finding an
implied videorecording exemption in the copyright law, and whether
home videorecording constituted fair use, with an emphasis on the lat-
149. The Sony court found no error in the district court's decision regarding the retail defend-
ants and thus affirmed that part of the district court's decision. 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 198 1).
Any further reference in this article to corporate appellees will not include a discussion of retail
appellees.
150. Contributory infringement is a concept borrowed from patent law. The court in Stami-
carbon, N. V Y. McNally-Pitisburg Mfg. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 525 (D. Kan. 1969), defined contribu-
tory infringement as the intentional aiding of one person by another in the unlawful making,
selling or using of a patented invention. A contributory infringer is a person who induces, aids or
contributes to the wrongful acts of another that constitute infringement. Id at 53 1. Contributory
infringement thus results from the furnishing of plans of an infringing device or from designing
and helping to build an infringing machine. Id
To prevail on a cause of action for contributory infringement, patentees (copyright owners)
must establish infringement of a valid patent (copyright). Wilbur v. Superior Concrete Accesso-
ies, 217 F. Supp. 600, 602 (N.D. Cal. 1963). A plaintiff in a contributory infringement suit must
establish that defendant sold material to be used in a patented (copyrighted) process; that such
material constituted part of a patented (copyrighted) process; that defendants knew such material
was especially adapted for use in the infringement of such patent (copyright); and that such mate-
rial was not a staple item of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. Sing v. Culture
Products, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1979). For a discussion on the "staple item of com-
merce" theory, see infra note 163.
It has been held that suits involving contributory infringement are limited to where defendant
himself has not directly infringed a patent (copyright) by making, using or selling the invention
but has induced someone else to infringe the patent (copyright). Self v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc.,
566 F.2d 62, 64 (9th Cir. 1977). The Sony court, therefore, correctly held that defendants met the
definition of contributory infringers.
151. See supra note 148.
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ter.' 52 Since there was no prior case law to look to concerning home
use of VTRs, apart from the district court's decision below, the Sony
court sought guidance from and stressed the importance of the copy-
right scheme as encompassed under current statutory law. 153
The Sony court found the statutory framework unambiguous and
noted that the only limitations upon copyright owners' exclusive rights
to their works were the limitations impos~d by the statutory excep-
tions. 154 Emphasizing that courts should not carve out exceptions to
the Act's broad grant of rights absent clear direction from Congress, the
Sony court maintained that the district court misread the Act and thus
confused the scope of the relevant issue which needed to be ad-
dressed. 155 According to the Sony court, the question that should have
been asked was whether Congress had intended to limit the rights of
copyright owners in ways not specified in sections 107-118 of the Act. 156
Absent consideration of the fair use doctrine, the Sony court concluded
that an analysis of the Act precluded a finding of an implied home
video recording exception and that, therefore, the district court had
erred in this respect.
The Sony court then discussed the distinction between judicial
treatment that should be afforded to sound versus video recordings.
The court first stressed the Act's separate treatment of sound recordings
and audiovisual works as categories of protected materials. 5 7 Noting
that audiovisual works were specifically excluded from limited excep-
tions provided by section 108 of the Act, the court concluded that Con-
gress clearly did not intend to create a blanket exemption for home
video recording, even if the recording was not for commercial pur-
poses.158 Next, the court mentioned that most of the rationale for rec-
152. 659 F.2d at 965.
153. The Sony court explicitly referred to § 106 of the Act and noted that the general ap-
proach of the Act was to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in broad terms, and then
to provide various limits, qualifications or exemptions in the following sections. In other words,
§§ 107-18 must be read in conjunction with § 106. Id, citing H.R. REP. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 61, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5674.
154. 659 F.2d at 966.
155. Id
156. The question to be answered was not whether Congress exhibited an intent to protect a
copyright owner from certain reproduction of his works. Congress had already answered that
question by extending the rights given copyright owners set forth in § 106, subject to the specific
sections of 107-18. Id
157. Section 102(a)(6) of the Act lists "motion pictures and other audiovisual works" as works
that are copyrightable, and § 102(a)(7) lists "sound recordings" as copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. at
§§ 102(a)(6), (a)(7) (Supp. III 1979).
158. Section 108(h) of the Act excludes audiovisual works other than an audiovisual work
dealing with the news. In addition, the House Report accompanying the Act noted, in regard to
§ 108(0(3), concerning audiovisual news programs, that such exemption was intended to permit
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ognizing an exemption for home sound recording, first recognized in
the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment, 59 was simply not applicable
to videorecording. Since Congress was not addressing the problem of
video recording in its discussion of the 1971 amendment, the Sony
court concluded that the district court's attempted analogy between a
sound and video recording exemption was erroneous. For a justifica-
tion of this conclusion, the Sony court reiterated the rule that silence
cannot be viewed as an expression of congressional intent 160 and also
cited the proposition that resort to the legislative history of an act is
entirely unnecessary when the act is facially unambiguous. 61
To complete its discussion of whether the home videorecording at
issue was an infringement, the Sony court next discussed, at length, the
applicability of the fair use doctrine. After an in-depth analysis of the
four factors of the fair use doctrine, as codified in section 107 of the
Act, and a review of the Act's legislative history, the Sony court con-
cluded that the doctrine did not sanction home videorecording. 162
Thus the Sony court reversed the holding of the district court and
found that off-the-air copying of copyrighted audiovisual materials by
owners of Betamax VTRs constituted an infringement.
The next issue confronted by the Sony court was that of the liabil-
ity of the corporate appellees. In this context, the Sony court again
disagreed with the district court. The district court's reliance on the
"staple item of commerce"'' 63 theory was criticized by the Sony court as
only libraries and archives to make available off-the-air videotape recordings of daily newscasts to
scholars and researchers for use in research projects. H.R. REP. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 77,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5690-91.
159. 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 109 (1976)).
160. Turpen v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 163 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated, 439 U.S. 974 (1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
161. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); United States v. Wilson, 591 F.2d 546
(9th Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States E.P.A., 507 F.2d 905,
915 (9th Cir. 1974).
162. 659 F.2d at 971.
163. The "staple item of commerce theory" is used in the patent context to define contributory
(patent) infringement. 659 F.2d at 975. A staple item of commerce is simply an article of com-
merce that is put to ordinary use; an article of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use. See, e.g., Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286, 293-95 (3d Cir. 1948); 35 U.S.C.
§ 27 l(c)(1976). The extent of a product's noninfringing capabilities determines the proper appli-
cation of the "staple item" doctrine. The less substantial a product's noninfringing use, the less
compelling is the staple article of commerce argument. Under current patent law, the key to
determining contributory infringement lies in the knowledge of the seller. 35 U.S.C. at § 271(c).
For example, § 271 (c) of the statute requires that the seller know that the component is "especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use." Id
The status of a component as a staple or commodity suitable for substantial noninfringing use
is essentially a question of fact. Compare Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993
(9th Cir. 1975) with United States Indus., Inc. v. Otis Eng'r Corp., 277 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1960).
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inappropriate. 164 The district court analogized VTRs to cameras or
photocopying machines stating that the sale of a staple article of com-
merce, while technically contributing to any subsequent infringing use
made thereof, would expand the basis of liability to an extent beyond
judicial management. 65 Since virtually all television programs are
copyrighted, and VTRs are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the
primary purpose of recording televised programs, the VTRs themselves
are not "suitable for substantial noninfringing use."' 166
The Sony court also denounced the district court's holding that an
alleged contributory infringer have actual knowledge that the activity
which he made possible constitutes copyright infringement. The Sony
court stressed that it was only necessary for the copyright appellees to
have had knowledge of the infringing activity-not its legal conse-
quences. After adopting the district court's definition of a contributory
infringer,167 the Sony court concluded that the corporate appellees met
this definition.
The Sony court then addressed the problem of fashioning the ap-
propriate relief. While recognizing that this was an exceedingly com-
plex and difficult problem, and, as such, could have been the reason
why the district court did not find appellees liable, the Sony court
urged that such difficulty must not deter federal courts from affording
appropriate relief to those whose rights have been infringed. In re-
manding the issue of relief to the district court, the Sony court set forth
some guidelines that would be appropriate for the district court to fol-
low. 168 Warning the district court not to be overly concerned with the
prospective harm to appellees, the Sony court stated that once a deter-
mination of copyright infringement is made, the continued profitability
of appellees' business is of only secondary concern. 69
However, it is well settled that "the mere addition of extenders to a staple article does not make
the article nonstaple." Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prod., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1002 n.3 (9th Cir.
1975).
164. 659 F.2d at 975.
165. 480 F. Supp. at 459.
166. NIMMER, supra note 11, at § 12.04[A], 12-39.
167. A contributory infringer was defined as "[oine who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 197 1) (foot-
note omitted).
168. The Sony court listed a few possibilities, such as statutory damages and equitable reme-
dies, that the district court could consider in fashioning the appropriate relief. Stating that the
district court should reconsider the usefulness of an injunction, the Sony court noted the general
rule that a copyright plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction when liability has been estab-
lished and there is a threat of continuing violations. 659 F.2d at 976.
169. Id
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ANALYSIS
Necessity of Considering the Legislative History of Copyright Law
The Sony court properly found that home videorecording of tele-
casts constitutes copyright infringement since such recording is neither
exempted from the protection afforded copyright owners under the cur-
rent copyright law nor encompassed by the fair use doctrine. Unlike
the district court, which bypassed the statutory framework of the 1976
Act, 170 the Sony court's statutory analysis directly confronted the real
issue of whether Congress intended to limit the rights of copyright
owners in ways not specified in the Act under sections 107-118.
The Statutory Distinction Between Audio and Visual Recording
Concluding that Congress had not impliedly created a home
videorecording exemption in the Act, the Sony court contrasted home
videorecording with home sound recording, which is exempt.17 1 The
Sound Recording Amendment and its analogue in the Act clearly did
not support the district court's conclusion that Congress intended to
exclude control of private, noncommercial videotaping from the scope
of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. Not only did section 102(a)
of the Act delineate audiovisual works and sound recordings as sepa-
rate categories, thus deserving of separate treatment, but sections 106
and 114 also provided justification for concluding that any exemption
granted for sound recordings would be inapplicable to audiovisual
works. 172
Fair Use: The Threshold Consideration
The question of whether the recording was infringement could not
be answered, however, without an analysis of the four factors of the fair
use doctrine as embodied in section 107 of the Act. Before addressing
170. In its incorrect analysis of both the 1976 Act and the legislative history behind the Act,
the district court erroneously characterized its task as a search for whether Congress intended to
protect a copyright owner from certain reproductions of his work. A closer look at § 106 would
have revealed to the district court that Congress had already expressed its intent to extend such
protection. 659 F.2d at 966.
171. Though the district court found these two situations analogous, its reasoning has been
subject to much criticism. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.. "Fair Use" Looks
Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980); Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating
Public Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243 (1979); Note, Copy-
right-The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 237 (1979); NIMMER, supra
note 11, at § 13.05[F][5], 13-95, 96 n.159 (1981).
172. Section 106 of the Act describes the author's exclusive rights in the copyrighted works
and § 114 limits those exclusive rights in sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (Supp. III
1979).
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these four factors, the Sony court considered several preliminary issues.
As stated in the first sentence of section 107,173 fair use has traditionally
involved "productive uses" of copyrighted material. That is, a subse-
quent use of information contained in the original copyrighted work is
permissible while a mere reproduction of a copyrighted work for use
for its intrinsic purpose-its "ordinary" use-generally is not protected
under the fair use doctrine. 174 Although not in itself a sufficient indica-
tor of fair use without the traditional four-factor analysis, the produc-
tivity of the use presents a threshold consideration in a fair use analysis.
Since the home user of the VTR merely wishes to increase his access to
television entertainment and neither adds anything to the copied work
nor uses it in the development of a new work, home use of a VTR lies
beyond the scope of fair use. 175 Unlike the district court, which failed
to address this crucial threshold question, the Sony court correctly con-
cluded that the fair use doctrine did not sanction home
videorecording. 176
Although the Sony court mentioned Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States 177 as an illustration of a recent case that rejected the pro-
ductive use theory, it clearly distinguished Williams & Wilkins from the
instant case. In Williams & Wilkins, two government libraries copied
entire articles from medical journals and distributed them to an in-
house research staff. The United States Court of Claims held this to be
fair use on the theory that, even though the recipients would make or-
dinary use of the copied material (by reading the photocopy rather
than the journal), the ordinary use directly promoted the advancement
of medicine and medical research. 178 The Sony case, in comparison,
173. Section 107 begins by stating "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of § 106, the fair use of a
copyrighted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copy-
right. ... 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. III 1979).
174. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978).
175. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica: Application of the Fair Use
Doctrine Under the United States Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 661
(1980).
176. 659 F.2d at 971.
177. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
178. Id at 1356. Williams & Wilkins is a key case in any discussion of fair use since the four
factors of the doctrine as expressed in that case were codified in the 1976 Act. In Williams &
Wilkins, the purpose of the use was not only noncommercial but was also intended for public
benefit. The amount and substantiality of the material copied was also an important factor to be
considered. Although entire articles were copied in that case, the court noted instances in which
the copying of entire works was permitted. As for the element of damage to the copyright owner,
the court observed that though the publishers may have been losing journal subscriptions and
reprint sales, their business as a whole was thriving. After examining these factors and the crucial
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had no corresponding countervailing societal benefit to weigh against
the interests of the copyright owner.
The Purpose Factor
Proceeding to examine the four fair use factors found in section
107 of the Act, the Sony court found that home videorecording was in
no way sanctioned by the fair use doctrine. In its analysis of the pur-
pose factor, the Sony court noted that courts have traditionally applied
this factor to exempt copyrighted material used for criticism, research
or other independent work. 179 The fact that home videorecording did
not further a traditionally accepted purpose clearly weighed against a
finding of fair use. In an apparent attempt to avoid a finding of in-
fringement and the ensuing difficulty of providing an appropriate rem-
edy, the district court had emphasized the private, noncommercial
aspect of home videorecording. However, a simple commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction, as used by the district court, is not
only absent from the Act but is also of limited predictive value. The
Act contrasts commercial with nonprofit educational purposes, and the
copying of entertainment works for convenience clearly does not fall
within the latter category.' 80 Since courts generally subordinate the
user's motive to a consideration of the economic detriment to the copy-
right owner, the absence of commercial motive, even in conjunction
with an educational purpose, does not conclusively determine fair use.
The Nature Factor
Analysis of the second fair use factor-the nature of the copy-
righted work-similarly did not support a finding of fair use. Despite
the accepted notions that home VTRs are usedprimariy for entertain-
ment purposes' 8 ' and that such purposes do not fall within the scope of
fair use,' 8 2 the district court found the nature of the copyrighted works
indicative of fair use by virtue of their being voluntarily broadcast over
public airwaves. 8 3 As noted by the Sony court, the method chosen to
factor of the scientific nature of the work and its intended use, the court concluded that library
photocopying of technical journals in limited number may be fair use. Id at 1362.
179. 659 F.2d at 972.
180. Id
181. See supra note 103.
182. See supra note 102.
183. The only possible argument for the district court's holding was one raised in anticipation
of the Supreme Court decision in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
However, the holding in Aiken, that the playing of radio broadcasts in a restaurant by restaurant
owners did not infringe the copyright in the broadcast songs, failed to support the argument that
broadcasting signals are dedicated to the public. Id at 161-62.
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distribute copyrighted works is clearly irrelevant to this second fair use
factor. 184 Moreover, an examination of the Act would not reveal any
implied license for public copying simply by virtue of the voluntary
nature of broadcasting films over public airwaves. While granting
some limited exemptions from copyright sanctions,' 85 the Act further
states that off-the-air taping of audiovisual works not falling within the
express exemptions would only be noninfringing if they fell within the
fair use defense. Therefore, the fact that the copyrighted programs
were voluntarily broadcast did not in itself indicate that their copying
was fair use. ' 86
The Substantiality Factor
The third factor-the substantiality of the copying-also did not
support a finding of fair use. While acknowledging that home use re-
cording off-the-air usually involved an exact duplication of the entire
original copyrighted work which would generally preclude a finding of
fair use, the district court seemed to simply ignore this general rule and
found that copying the entire work in this case was fair use. 187 The
Sony court recognized the obvious error in the district court's attempt
to connect the substantiality of the copying with the harm factor and
properly denounced such reasoning as prior case law certainly did not
make such connection. 88
The Harm Factor
Concluding its fair use analysis, the Sony court properly main-
tained that the fourth factor-the effect of the use upon the potential
market or value of the copyrighted work-did not dictate a contrary
result. Adopting the dissenting view in Williams & Wilkins, 18 9 the Sony
court recognized that the district court's requirement of proof of actual
184. 659 F.2d at 972.
185. See supra note 24.
186. Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash.
1969), also supports the conclusion that the nature of the copyrighted works at issue as voluntarily
telecast over public airwaves is not indicative of fair use.
187. 659 F.2d at 973.
188. The district court in Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184
(S.D. Cal. 1955), stated that "[t]he right of a copyright proprietor to exclude others is absolute and
if it has been violated the fact that the infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of the
work or pecuniarily damage him is immaterial."
189. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). The Williams & Wilkins decision has been criticized for placing seemingly paramount
importance on the showing of concrete harm by the copyright owner. See Nimmer, Photocopying
and Record Piracy. of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1052 (1975). A
recognized leading authority on copyright law, Professor Nimmer expressed that the Court of
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damages was too great a burden to impose on copyright plaintiffs. 90
The Sony court further recognized that failure to prove damages would
not automatically justify a finding of fair use, but would, in fact, en-
courage a finding of minimum statutory damages liability.' 9'
Furthermore, the Sony court's analysis of the fourth fair use factor
found significance in a critical factor which the district court over-
looked-the cumulative effect of mass reproduction of copyrighted
works made possible by VTRs.' 92 While damage to copyright owners
might have been minimal if home users of VTRs acted in isolation, the
aggregate effect of mass copying as home VTRs proliferate creates a
strong argument in favor of prohibiting unauthorized reproductions of
any copyrighted work.1 93 Absence of any inquiry into the full scope of
the infringing practice would clearly leave copyright plaintiffs facing
insuperable obstacles to the protection of their rights. When the full
scope of the infringing activity is considered, however, the potential
market for appellants' works is clearly diminished.
Claims' treatment of the harm element was erroneous because actual harm need not be shown to
establish liability. NIMMER supra note 11, at § 13.05[E][4][C].
Furthermore, the new copyright law has a provision for granting statutory damages. 17
U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1979). Such provision would be a nullity if actual damages were required
to be shown. The only possible justification for the Williams & Wilkins decision is that the doc-
trine of fair use has always been flexible, but the totality of circumstances must still be evaluated.
See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928
(1970). Congressional legislative history behind the 1976 Act supports this reasoning:
Although the courts have considered and ruled on the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is
an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5659, 5679.
190. Courts generally state that irreparable harm is presumed since defendants have an oppor-
tunity at trial to rebut the presumption. Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F.
Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). The Sony court found it clear that appellees did not establish with
any degree of certainty that such harm would not occur.
191. Professor Nimmer maintained that a finding of fair use could only be justified when there
is a "general dissemination of an allegedly infringing work by all potential defendants, and with-
out limitation as to the number of reproductions, and the volume of users would still not adversely
affect the plaintiffs potential market. NIMMER supra note 11, at § 13.05[E][4][C], 13-84.
192. 659 F.2d at 974.
193. The aggregate effect theory has been recognized in other contexts, such as limiting the
number of copies of a work that may be made for classroom use because of potential damage to
textbook publishers. H.R. REP. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5682-83.
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THE TROUBLESOME PROBLEM OF FASHIONING THE APPROPRIATE
REMEDY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The Confusion and Inconsistency of the District Court's Reasoning
In its discussion of the home use194 aspect of videorecording as it
applied to the purpose and nature factor, the district court notably con-
fused the issue of liability with the problem of fashioning the appropri-
ate relief. The district court incorrectly reasoned that private
videorecording of copyrighted programs by private individuals in their
homes should be considered a fair use because of the protection af-
forded by the first amendment's right of privacy. The Supreme Court
discussed this right in support of its holding in Stanley v. Georgia 195
that a statute prohibiting the mere possession of filmed or printed ob-
scene matter in the privacy of the home violated the first amendment.
The Stanley Court considered it beyond the power of the state to tell a
person what books he may read or what films he may watch. 196
The home-use VTR situation is clearly distinguishable from Stan-
ley, however, since prohibiting the copying of televised programs does
not prevent an individual from viewing the programs that are broad-
cast in the privacy of the home. While possession of home videotapes
produced by recordings of television programs may be protected by the
first amendment right to privacy, the making of those tapes is legiti-
mately prohibited by the 1976 Act.
It may also be argued that since the copying of copyrighted pro-
grams occurs in the home and there is no intent to further distribute the
tapes, the Stanley Court's holding extends the right of privacy to pro-
tect such copying. Since the Stanley decision was rendered, however,
numerous Supreme Court cases have indicated an extreme reluctance
to extend the holding beyond the precise factual setting in Stanley. 197
The Sony court correctly noted the district court's confusion and stated
that first amendment privacy concerns did not permit an unrestrained
dissemination of copyrighted works in the name of the public interest
at the expense of legally recognized rights in intellectual property. An
194. The concept of home use was developed as an extension of fair use in University City
Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
195. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
196. Id at 565.
197. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973);
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (viewing in public theater not protected);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (transporting in interstate commerce by private car-
riage not protected).
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inquiry into privacy concerns would thus be best suited for determining
relief sought, not for determining the liability of alleged infringers.
The Strengths of the Sony Court Reasoning
After a finding of infringement, the Sony court did not try to ex-
cuse liability of appellees as did the district court. Rejecting the district
court's reliance on the clearly inappropriate "staple item of commerce"
theory, 98 the Sony court held that VTRs were in no way suitable for
substantial noninfringing use. VTRs were manufactured, advertised,
and sold primarily for the purpose of reproducing television programs,
and since virtually all television programs consisted of copyrighted
works, VTRs could not be compared with staple items of commerce
that only technically contribute to an infringing use subsequently made
of them. 199 The Sony court again dismissed the district court's falla-
cious reasoning that the corporate appellees' knowledge was insuffi-
cient to make them contributory infringers. Neither a copyright
defendant's innocence nor his mistake as to the legal consequences of
his actions would absolve him of liability for infringement; such inno-
cence or mistakeness only affects the remedies available. 200
Adopting the district court's definition of a contributory in-
fringer,20 ' the Sony court logically concluded that it was impossible to
find that the corporate appellees did not know that the Betamax would
be used to reproduce copyrighted materials, since that was its most con-
spicuous use. Beyond any doubt, therefore, the corporate appellees
met this definition.20 2
The Problems of Coping with Technological Change
While many commentators203 have viewed legislation, rather than
198. See supra note 163.
199. 480 F. Supp. at 461.
200. NIMMER supra note 11, at § 13.08 (1976). The Copyright Act supports the Sony court's
reasoning in its provisions for a reduction of statutory damages if the infringer "was not aware
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright," 17
U.S.C. at § 504(c)(2) (1976), and a remission of statutory damages, if the "infringer believed and
had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use."
Id This discussion of liability obviously pertains only to civil, not criminal, liability.
201. See supra note 167.
202. There was also no doubt that appellees met the other requirements for contributory in-
fringement-inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the infringing conduct of another.
659 F.2d at 976.
203. Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.. "Fair Use" Looks Different on Video-
tape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980); Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access and
Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243 (1979); Comment, Home Videorecord-
ing and Copyright Law: The Betamax Case, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1277 (1980); Note, Copy-
right-The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 231 (1979); Note, Universal
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judicial pronouncement, as an obvious technique for effecting a large-
scale overhaul of copyright law, 20 4 it should be noted that legislation
cannot go far beyond mandating the Act's four general guidelines. In
an era of rapidly changing technology, it is important to recognize
Congress' inability to keep pace with rapid changes. For example, it
notably took Congress almost seventy years before it devised a "new"
Copyright Act that was supposed to answer pressing problems concern-
ing transcription and its application to the copyright law.
Within just five years of the enactment of the 1976 Act, Congress
has again been confronted with a new technology, the VTR, demand-
ing a change in the copyright law. In response to the Sony decision,
five bills have been introduced in Congress proposing an exemption for
home use of VTRs.20 5 Even if it decides this issue in a timely fashion,
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica. Application ofthe Fair Use Doctrine Under the United
States Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 661 (1980).
204. In effect, the outcome of the Sony case would radically change prior interpretations of the
Act, perhaps rendering it altogether useless.
205. See S. 1758, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), introducedon 10/21/81; H.R. 4808, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981), introduced on 10/21/81, both of which create a new § 119 providing for an ex-
emption for certain video recordings. These bills state in pertinent part that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copy-
right for an individual to record copyrighted works on a video recorder if-
(1) the recording is made for a private use; and
(2) the recording is not used in a commercial nature.
Id
Although Senator Mathias has introduced amendment no. 1331 as an amendment to S. 1758,
known as the "Mathias amendment," it is in reality its own separate bill. This amendment de-
clares that all reproduction of copyrighted audiovisual works through videotaping is copyright
infringement. However, no liability would lie for private home videotaping for non-commercial
purposes. Rather, the liability would be placed on the importer or manufacturer of VTRs or upon
the VTRs themselves, along with the tapes they use, for the infringing activity of individuals who
reproduce copyrighted works using the VTRs and VTR tapes.
Under this amendment, each video product, manufacturer and importer would be required to
obtain a compulsory license. Such license would enable a person to use a copyrighted work by
complying with certain conditions, notwithstanding the fact that the use would otherwise be in-
fringing. The royalty fee to be paid by video producers, manufacturers and distributors would be
determined by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT). For an in-depth discussion of the CRT,
see infra notes 210-15.
Under the Mathias amendment, the CRT must hold a formal proceeding to establish "appro-
priate and reasonable" royalty fees so that copyright owners receive "fair compensation." See
HOME VCR & COPYRIGHT, COMPENDIUM OF ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION TO Ex-
EMPT FROM COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT HOME RECORDING OF TV PROGRAMS FOR PRIVATE
VIEWING. The amendment grants the CRT authority to set rules by which royalties either would
not be paid at all on tapes used principally for purposes other than making home video recordings
of copyrighted material or would be reduced for all tapes and devices to account for the fact that
not all VTR uses infringe on copyrights. Id While providing that the royalties are to be distrib-
uted to copyright owners who file claims, the Mathias amendment provides no clue as to what
criteria the CRT should use in distributing the revenues.
The Mathias amendment gives the CRT too much responsibility for evaluating, setting, and
distributing compulsory royalties for video recording, with only minimal legislative guidance.
The proposed copyright royalty scheme will create not only an unnecessary and impractical regu-
latory bureaucracy but also inequity and discrimination since there is no way that a statutory
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Congress' decision would most likely be not only too narrow in
scope, 206 but would also be subject to subsequent expansion or modifi-
cation when confronted with new modes of technology. Furthermore,
any congressional determination will, of necessity, ultimately be re-
turned to the courts for a proper interpretation. Given Congress' fail-
ure to articulate a coherent rationale for copyright, its failure to define
fair use, and its failure to clarify the confusion it created between fair
use and exempted use, there is grave doubt that legislation is a practica-
ble method for applying the fair use concept to the endless variety of
situations that can arise in particular cases.
Future Forumsfor Coping with Copyright Disputes
Current copyright law is clearly incapable of meeting the chal-
lenges confronting it: challenges under the guise of new forms of me-
dia technology. The most practical forum for resolving controversy
and for converting the fair use doctrine into a workable set of rules is
the conference table.20 7 A quasi-judicial body composed of representa-
royalty scheme can reflect the varied uses to which home VTRs are put by an individual, such as
making home video movies, or taping programs that either are uncopyrighted or are available for
home taping by consent of their owners. Id The CRT's dismal record in discharging its existing
responsibilities, however, suggests that it would be absurd to burden with substantial and complex
new duties a body whose own chairman has recommended be abolished. Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (March 4, 1981) (testimony of Clarence James, Chair-
man, Copyright Royalty Tribunal).
Another congressional bill exempting home videorecording from infringement states in perti-
nent part that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright
for an individual to record copyrighted works on a videorecorder if the recording is
made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and is to be uti-
lized in a private home.
H.R. 5250, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), introduced on 12/16/81.
Similarly, H.R. 4783, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), introduced on 10/20/81, states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright
for an individual to record copyrighted works on a home video recorder in a private
home if-
(1) the recording is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial
advantage; and
(2) The recording is to be utilized exclusively in a private home.
Id Finally, H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), introduced on 3/3/82, is similar to the Mathias
amendment as it also proposes the establishment of a compulsory license/royalty system for video
recording devices and media.
206. Since the Sony court failed to deal with other confusing issues presently confronted by
the courts, any statutory exception to the Sony decision would also fail to address such issues and
would thus be a piecemeal approach to this copyright problem. Issues such as videotaping from
cable or pay television, tape swapping, tape duplication, and off-the-air recording for classroom or
business purposes would remain unresolved.
207. Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for Visual, Auditory, and Audio- Visual Copyrights,
in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 335 (Lawrence & Timberg eds. 1980).
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tives of the various communications industries, 208 members of the gen-
eral public, and attorneys representing copyright creator groups,
teachers, and librarians should be brought together to make a concen-
trated effort to work out commercially viable rules that would reason-
ably implement the two basic rights of the copyright system:
compensation to the copyright owner and fair use to the copyright user.
It would be advantageous to establish this body as a permanent
institution.20 9 In this respect, it would be similar to the statutorily cre-
ated Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT)210 which is responsible, in
part, for determining copyright royalty rates for records,21' juke-
boxes212 and certain cable transmissions.213 Like the statutorily enu-
merated objectives of the CRT,214 the proposed forum should strive to
maximize the availability of creative works to the public while afford-
ing the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work. Efforts
should be made to reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and
the copyright user in the product made accessible to the public with
respect to their capital investment, cost, risk, relative creative contribu-
tion and technological contribution, as well as their contribution to cre-
ating new markets for creative expression. 21 5
208. The various industries involved would include, but not necessarily be limited to, those of
photography, motion pictures, television, and videotape publishing.
209. Cf. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977).
210. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (Supp. III 1979). See Brennan, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 25
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 196 (1978); Brylawski, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1265 (1977).
The CRT is composed of five members appointed to seven-year staggered terms by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a) (Supp. III 1979). The purposes
of the CRT are three-fold. The first is to fix initial terms and rates of royalty payments by public
broadcasters under compulsory noncommercial broadcasting licenses. Id at § 118(b). The sec-
ond is to review and adjust periodically royalty rates under the: compulsory musical recording
licenses, Id at §§ 801(b)(l), 804(a), compulsory coin-operated phonorecord players licenses, Id,
the compulsory noncommercial broadcasting licenses, Id. at §§ 118(c), 801 (b)(2), and the compul-
sory cable television secondary transmission licenses, Id at § 11 8(b)(2). The third is to distribute
royalty fees under compulsory coin-operated phonorecord players licenses, Id at §§ 116(c),
80 1(b)(3), and compulsory cable television secondary transmission licenses, Id at §§ I ll(d)(5),
801(b)(3), after settling any controversies over distribution. Id at §§ 801(b)(3), 804.
In addition to publishing reports on each of its final determinations, the CRT is required to
make an annual report to the President and Congress concerning the CRT's work during the
preceding fiscal year, including a detailed financial statement of account. Id. at § 808. CRT deci-
sions are subject to judicial review by the courts of appeals. Id at § 810.
211. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. III 1979).
212. Id at § 116.
213. Id. at § 111.
214. Id at §§ 115, 116. See H. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 292 n.21 (1979).
215. Despite its admirable goals, the CRT has been plagued since its creation by inadequacies
and failures. A principal problem has been its apparent inability to establish workable criteria for
determining royalties caused by the lack of any congressionally created clear-cut standards. The
Copyright Act simply directs the CRT to balance such vague and subjective criteria as "the rela-
tive roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the
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Unlike the CRT, however, this forum should not become an out-
growth of congressional power. Its membership should neither consist
of political appointees nor should the forum itself be directly accounta-
ble to the executive or legislative branch of government. Rather, its
composition would prove more viable as a private sector body analo-
gous to the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers
(ASCAP), or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).216 The forum would thus
function as a conduit between copyright owners and members of the
general public seeking access to copyrighted works. Like ASCAP and
BMI, this forum should have the authority to police copyright users as
well as to enforce procedures that will be established to assure access to
copyrighted works while simultaneously safeguarding the rights of
copyright owners against infringement.
However, the scope of its authority should not be limited to spe-
cific copyright problem areas. Instead, the scope of its authority should
reflect the composition of its membership. That is, its authority should
public"; "maximizing the availability of creative works to the public"; and the need to provide "a
fair return" to copyright owners for their creations. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (Supp. III 1979).
Even if Congress had set out clearer standards for CRT decisions, the agency would still not
be able to handle complex rate review and distribution matters. This is due to several basic or-
ganizational flaws which impede the CRT's ability to reach decisions. For example, the CRT
receives only such evidence as the parties before it choose to submit because it lacks subpoena
power. In addition, CRT members have demonstrated a lack of expertise in the areas in which
they render decisions. For instance, the CRT has no general counsel, although its duties require it
to deal with complex legal issues involving contracts law, the first amendment, and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, as well as copyright law. HOME VCR & COPYRIGHT, COMPENDIUM OF
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION TO EXEMPT FROM COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT HOME
RECORDING OF TV PROGRAMS FOR PRIVATE VIEWING. Similarly, although economic analysis is
critical in determining appropriate royalty rates and distribution, the CRT retains no economic
consultants. Id
216. These are statutorily recognized (17 U.S.C. § 116(e)(3) (Supp. II1 1979)), nonprofit orga-
nizations which license the nondramatic public performance of musical works. Each organization
is responsible for different collections of music. All of the license fees they receive, less operating
expenses and reserve, are distributed to affiliated song writers and music publishers. Goldstein,
Questions and Answers About the Performance of Music under the New Copyright Law, in CUR-
RENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 806 (1982). The typical BMI or ASCAP license pro-
vides that, upon the payment of an annual fee, the licensee is given permission to make an
unlimited number of nondramatic performances of all of the licensing organization's music, with-
out any necessity for the licensee to keep any records of the music actually used. Id. at 807.
Virtually all music publishing companies are thus licensed by both BMI and ASCAP to avoid
charges of copyright infringement.
ASCAP is a classic example of the possibility of a harmonious relationship between copyright
owners and users. Its membership is composed of 50% songwriters and 50% music publishers. In
this type of "co-op" 12 writer-members are elected to a Board of Directors by other writers while
12 publisher-members are elected to the Board by other publishers. See Finkelstein, The Role of
ASCAP in Licensing the Right to Perform Copyrighted Musical Works, 17 IDEA 15, 18 (Fall 1975).
All fees received are divided equally in half to be distributed to writers and publishers. Id Be-
cause of its membership composition, this organization is able to promote the competing self inter-
ests of its members in such a way as to satisfy both copyright owners and users. The theme of
cooperation among various copyright participants should also be instituted in the proposed forum.
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extend to encompass a wide spectrum of copyright issues, both present
and future. In this way, flexibility of the copyright law as well as the
forum itself will be maintained. Perhaps certain panels of judges could
be established consisting of members not from the specific area in
which the controversy arises, since bias or the appearan.e of bias would
be hard to avoid, but from allied fields to assure that they are capable
of understanding the arguments presented. Although panels would
change over time, allowing for both membership and industry modifi-
cation, the basic framework of such body would remain stable, and
presumably a body of procedural rules, customs and usages would
arise. The decisions of the judges could then either become directly
applicable as the new law itself, a most desirable result given the rapid-
ity of current technological changes, or be embodied as a recommenda-
tion for Congress to act upon. The crucial point is that the law must be
flexible if it is to remain contemporary.
Two main justifications exist for creating such a forum. The first is
the need to establish an accurate framework in which the various me-
dia industries would use a certain specified technology. This is the
point at which the dialogue between copyright creators and copyright
users would best be utilized. In effect, such dialogue will produce an
enlightened perception of each party's respective long-term interest re-
flecting both the proper cost-benefit ratios for copyright owners and
users and the proper balancing between compensation to the copyright
owner and fair use to the copyright user.
A second goal for settling copyright issues is to limit the power
exercised by any one media faction at a particular time. The constant
give-and-take of ideas, along with the assured representation of the
various industries involved, will prevent any one industry from domi-
nating the current market and will again produce the proper balance
between the needs of copyright owners and users. 217 Thus, the virtue of
such a decision-making body is that it would harness bias and self-
217. In this collaborative enterprise, the entertainment industry should recognize the benefits
that the teaching, research and librarian professions confer on the copyright owner by training
people to create, produce and promote their copyrighted works. These professions are responsible
for exposing current audiovisual products to the public thereby stimulating the commercial de-
mand for those products and for raising the performance and aesthetic standards of creators.
While having the right to sue those believed to be plagiarizing the copyrighted works, copyright
owners should be aware of the heavy cost and uncertainties of litigation and should engage in
litigation only after applying the appropriate cost-benefit ratios. However, educational users of
copyright should be aware that the first amendment does not insulate them from a copyright
owner's exclusive right to his work, except where political matters and news events are involved.
Moreover, fair use is only a defense to a charge of copyright infringement; it confers no blanket
immunity from such charges.
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interest and achieve an impartial, well-balanced approach to divergent
copyright problems through the use of an active dialogue among all
disciplines represented, including the benefit of legal advice.
CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit properly
found that home videorecording constituted copyright infringement.
Neither the legislative history nor the statutory language of the federal
copyright law supported a congressional intention to exempt home
users of VTRs from the scope of exclusive rights granted to copyright
owners over their works. Considering the nonproductive purpose of
the use, the substantiality of the taking, the primarily entertainment
aspect of the recorded material, and the potential economic harm to
appellants, home videorecording did not fall within the scope of the
fair use doctrine and thus infringed appellants copyrights. Sony, the
manufacturer of the Betamax VTR, and other corporate appellees,21 8
were thus found liable as contributory infringers for advertising and
promoting the Betamax's infringing use. The Sony court's nonhesita-
tion to directly answer the issues with which it was confronted was
commendable.
While the increasing availability and use of the Betamax VTR
raises serious policy questions, it is far from certain that Congress
would be the best forum for devising appropriate answers to those
questions. A better solution, perhaps, would be the formation of a con-
tinuing body of various copyright experts which would be able to keep
pace with the rapidly changing technology and would be best suited for
making the difficult decisions now faced by uncertain courts and legis-
lators. Such a well-informed body would be able to reach decisions
reconciling the needs of both copyright owners and the public.
218. All corporate appellees except the retailers were found guilty of contributory infringe-
ment by the Sony court. 659 F.2d at 976.

